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The Monetary Authority of Singapore conducts policy by adjusting the
Singapore dollar’s effective exchange rate so as to achieve macroeconomic
goals for the economy’s inflation rate and output gap. Estimates of a policy
rule of the Taylor type, except with exchange rate appreciation serving as the
instrument/indicator variable, substantiate this interpretation. That this
rule reflects policy that is much like inflation targeting is evidenced by the
absence of any significant role for the real exchange rate as a distinct target
variable in addition to inflation and the output gap. Simulations with a
dynamic model of a small open economy illustrate that this type of rule can
be relatively more advantageous in economies that (like Singapore) are
extremely open to international trade. The analysis illustrates that monetary
policy and exchange rate policy are two sides of the same coin, which suggests
that assignment of exchange rate management to a nation’s fiscal authority
is an anachronism. 
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A wide variety of monetary policy arrangements exists among the countries of East
Asia, ranging from the currency board system of Hong Kong and the constantly 
discussed regime in China to official inflation targeting in South Korea, Thailand, 
the Philippines, and elsewhere. One case that should be of particular interest is that of
Singapore. Of course, Singapore is a very small country—just a medium-large city—
yet it has a greater population and a larger GDP in U.S. dollar terms than those of 
New Zealand, whose central bank has been notable as a leader in the worldwide surge
toward inflation targeting.
1 More importantly, however, Singapore’s monetary policy
system is unique, fundamentally interesting, and not widely understood. There are a
few papers in existence that discuss the system, including items by Devereux (2003),
Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen (2006), Khor, Robinson, and Lee (2004), McCallum
(2006), McCauley (2001), Moreno (1988), Parrado (2004), Rajan and Siregar (2002),
Tian (2006), and Williamson (1998, 1999), plus several by the Monetary Authority of
Singapore (MAS). These reflect important differences in interpretation, however, over
the system’s essential nature. Accordingly, I propose to discuss aspects of the Singapore
system in the present paper, drawing heavily upon McCallum (2006).
II. Nature of the Singapore Monetary System
Let us begin with an informal description of the Singapore system, before turning 
to a presentation in terms of an analytical model. A useful quote from a one-page
summary by the MAS itself is as follows:
Since 1981, monetary policy in Singapore has been centered on the manage-
ment of the exchange rate. The primary objective has been to promote price 
stability as a sound basis for sustainable economic growth. The exchange rate
represents an ideal intermediate target of monetary policy in the context of the
small and open Singapore economy....First, the Singapore dollar is managed
against a basket of currencies of our major trading partners and competitors....
Second, MAS operates a managed float regime....The trade-weighted exchange
rate is allowed to fluctuate within a policy band, the level and direction of which
is announced semi-annually to the market.... Third, the exchange rate policy
band is periodically reviewed to ensure that it remains consistent with the
underlying fundamentals of the economy.
2
A careful reading of the foregoing, plus additional descriptions by MAS officials,
reveals a crucial aspect of this procedure. It is that the band, within which the
Singapore dollar effective exchange rate is kept, is not at all constant through time.
Instead, the band may move upward or downward automatically as time passes 
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1. International Financial Statistics figures for 2005 are 4.33 million people and US$115 billion for Singapore as
compared with 4.03 million people and US$98.7 billion for New Zealand. 
2. Monetary Authority of Singapore (n.d.).(to allow for expected ongoing appreciation or depreciation) and, more importantly,
both the level and slope of the band—and even its width—may be discretely adjusted
each decision period.
3 Crucially, these adjustments are made in a manner that is
designed to keep inflation low—that is, to promote price stability. Some adjustments
of the band may, in addition, be made in response to prevailing (or forecasted)
behavior of real variables such as aggregate output or employment. Thus, the type of
exchange rate management employed by the MAS is very different from a traditional
fixed exchange rate. In fact, it would appear that the MAS operates with policy objec-
tives quite similar to those of the Federal Reserve or the European Central Bank
(ECB) or the Bank of England: to maintain low inflation as a priority, with some
attention also paid to output and/or employment considerations. Indeed, the MAS
system might even be regarded as basically a variant of inflation targeting, not a fixed
exchange rate system! 
To continue in this vein, the MAS procedures seem very much like those of 
inflation-targeting central banks except that the MAS policy management involves
periodic adjustments in the exchange rate, rather than a short-term nominal interest
rate.
4 The reason for this difference in policy behavior is, moreover, quite straight-
forward and simple: the Singapore economy is much more open to foreign trade than
those of, for example, the United States, Japan, the euro area, or the United
Kingdom. Instead of an export/GDP ratio of about 0.15 (or about 0.25 for the
United Kingdom), for Singapore the value is currently about 1.4–1.5! Thus the
exchange rate channel of monetary policy transmission is much more important, 
relative to the familiar interest rate channel, than in larger economies that are less
open to international trade. Accordingly, use of the exchange rate, rather than a
short-term interest rate, as the principal instrument/indicator variable for monetary
policy may provide a relatively more effective way of managing aggregate demand.
5
This policy comparison will be analytically illustrated below.
The foregoing suggestion that the MAS policy framework is basically one in which
inflation is the main target variable, with the exchange rate being used primarily as 
an instrument or indicator for specifying policy actions that are designed to keep 
inflation close to target, is supported by the behavior of the exchange rate over the 
years 1981–2005. The period discussed begins with 1981, because that is the year in
which the current MAS policy regime was put in place, according to MAS (undated,
2001). The statistics indicate that, over the span from 1981 to the middle of 1997, the
Singapore dollar appreciated in value by about 45 percent relative to the policy basket,
despite a large drop in 1985–87. This appreciation was needed to prevent inflation,
since (1) foreign inflation was proceeding at a rate higher than the Singapore target 
and also (2) because rapid productivity growth in Singapore was bringing about 
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3. The MAS often refers to the “BBC” aspects of its procedure, these letters referring to “band, basket, and crawl.”
That terminology, which draws upon Williamson (1999, 2001), will be discussed further in Section III. 
4. As will be seen below, the MAS system includes practices that do not reflect policy transparency of the degree 
usually attributed to inflation-targeting central banks.
5. One should not infer, however, that adjustments in the exchange rate are necessarily implemented by open market
purchases in the foreign exchange market. Except when interest rates are at (or near) zero, such adjustments 
could alternatively be implemented by purchases in the domestic money market. Throughout, I presume that 
purchases or sales in the foreign exchange market are not sterilized. If a policy action concerning the exchange rate
is undertaken for the purpose of affecting aggregate demand, it makes no sense at all to use sterilized interventions.an ongoing appreciation in real terms, due perhaps to the Balassa-Samuelson effect. 
After a fall during the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98, the value of the Singapore 
dollar leveled off and has not changed much since. Even so, its value remained about
35 percent higher in 2005 than in 1981 in terms of the (trade-weighted) basket. 
More formal evidence in this regard requires a more analytical description of 
policy behavior. The most common formulaic representation of monetary policy 
procedures for more typical economies is provided by some variant of the “Taylor rule,”
introduced by Taylor (1993), which relates periodic adjustments in a money market
interest rate made in response to existing (or predicted) inflation and output gap 
measures. A standard formulation is
Rt = r +  pt +  1( pt −  
*) +  2(yt −yt –) +  t,      1,  2 ≥ 0, (1)
where Rt is the interest rate,  pt is the current inflation rate,  
* is the target inflation
rate (at which the central bank wishes to keep inflation on average), and yt − yt – is the
output gap, in other words, the percent (or fraction) by which real output exceeds the
“natural rate” of output that represents an efficient, market-clearing level. The term
 t represents random policy influences by the central bank, which in principle should
be very small.
In comparison to (1), the Singapore policy rule might be represented as follows:
 et =  e −  pt +  1( pt −  
*) +  2(yt − yt –) +  t,      1,  2 ≥ 0. (1′)
Here et is the log of the nominal exchange rate, expressed as foreign currency units
per unit of home-country money (e.g., yen/U.S. dollar if the United States is taken as
the home country). Correspondingly,  e is the average rate of appreciation of the
currency (perhaps negative) that reflects the sum of the long-run rate of appreciation
of the real exchange rate plus the average inflation rate abroad. Clearly, monetary 
policy designed to reduce inflation when it is above its target value would call for an
increase in  et under this rule, rather than an increase in Rt. This desired increase
could in principle be brought about by the central bank by conducting open-market
sales of foreign exchange, although in normal circumstances it could alternatively be
effected by the sale of short-term domestic securities, as would usually be the case
with the Taylor rule (1).
6 It should be emphasized that the policy behavior described
by (1′) is not intended to keep the exchange rate at any particular value other than
whatever would be consistent with the inflation and output gap targets specified on
the right-hand side of the relationship.
Is there any reason to believe that in reality MAS behaves in a manner similar to
rule (1′)? In that regard, MAS Staff Paper No. 31, 2004, written by Eric Parrado,
then of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), uses monthly data for 1991–2002
to estimate a rule of the form (1′) but with inclusion of an additional  et−1 term to
reflect smoothing of the exchange rate. (Also, his preferred equation uses the expected
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6. If foreign exchange and domestic short-term securities were perfect substitutes, then a purchase (of a given size) 
of either would have the same effect. This paper’s analysis presumes that these two assets are close but not 
perfect substitutes.inflation rate nine months into the future, rather than the current rate.) Parrado’s
(2004) instrumental variable estimates are as follows:
7
 et =−0.006 + 1.89Et−1 pt+9 + 0.42(yt − yt –) + 0.85 et−1. (2)
(0.009) (0.55) (0.14) (0.022) 
R
2 = 0.86     J-stat p-value = 0.85
Clearly, these estimates provide considerable support for the suggestion made above.
It must be said that the MAS normally does not describe its policy in this manner,
instead emphasizing the “BBC” (band, basket, and crawl) aspects of exchange rate
policy that have been promoted in the work of Williamson (1999)—see Khor,
Robinson, and Lee (2004). But if the band and its crawl are designed primarily to
achieve targets for  pt and yt − yt –, then this amounts basically to the same thing as
inflation targeting, as is argued above. 
III. Empirical Evidence
While the arguments and evidence presented in the previous section are highly 
suggestive, a more direct test of our proposition—that the Singapore system is much 
like a variant of inflation targeting—would clearly be useful. Such a test should 
be based on aspects of inflation targeting that differ from those of the approach 
of Williamson (1999, 2001, 2006) to policy management, as the latter has been
prominent in the MAS literature. I would argue that the most important operational
difference between the two is that inflation targeting presumes there will be no response
of policy to exchange rate movements (or departures from target values) beyond those
called for by inflation and output gaps relative to target. That characteristic is implied
by the Taylor-style formulation (1′) above. By contrast, Williamson’s writings, which
explicitly advertise their distinction from inflation targeting, call for an international
system based on “reference rates” that are basically targets for each economy’s real
exchange rate. A quote from Williamson (2006, pp. 7–8) may be helpful.
The concept of a reference rate was introduced many years ago by Ethier and
Bloomfield (1975). They thought of a reference rate as an officially agreed
exchange rate that would carry with it an obligation not to intervene... in a 
way that would tend to push the market exchange rateaway from the reference
rate. Countries would be allowed to intervene, but only in an internationally
sanctioned way—to push the rate toward the reference rate...Ethier and
Bloomfield did not address exactly what concept of the exchange rate was...
[relevant], but clearly it is what matters for the macroeconomy: the real effective
exchange rate.
17
Monetary Policy in East Asia: The Case of Singapore
7. Here the figures in parentheses are standard errors, the R
2 statistic is unadjusted, and the reported p-value is for
Hansen’s J-statistic for testing the hypothesis that the assumed orthogonality conditions are valid.Our strategy will be to estimate a policy equation, analogous to that in Parrado
(2004), to demonstrate independently that the Singapore exchange rate movements
are consistent with a policy of the type expressed in equation (1′), and then to add
additional variables, designed to reflect departures of the real effective exchange rate
from some target value, to see if these have any additional explanatory power beyond
that provided by the inflation and output gap variables in (1′).
8 Accordingly, we begin
with estimation of an equation similar to that of Parrado (2004), but using quarterly—
rather than monthly—observations. Also, following Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen
(2006), I use a four-quarter average inflation rate  pt
a instead of Parrado’s inflation rate
for nine months into the future. The sample period is 1981/Q1–2005/Q4, the start
date being that of the regime’s inception and the end date omitting recent observations
that might be subject to revision. The data series are mostly taken from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics; details are reported in the Data Appendix at the end
of the paper. Least squares estimates are
9
 et =−0.0025 + 0.3245 pt
a + 0.174(yt − yt –) + 0.0735 et−1. (3)
(0.0017) (0.0765) (0.0494) (0.0988) 
R
2 = 0.379     SE = 0.01274     DW = 2.05     T = 100
Here the results are reasonably similar to those of Parrado (2004), with inflation enter-
ing strongly and the output gap significantly. One major difference is that in (3) the
lagged dependent variable provides almost no explanatory power, whereas in Parrado
(2004) it is quite important. This difference is presumably attributable to the use here
of quarterly data series, Parrado’s being monthly. Our R
2 value is considerably lower,
but that is not of importance since our parameters’ standard errors are of the same
order of magnitude.
10
In considering the specification of (3), one reaction is to doubt the availability of
data on inflation and the output gap for quarter t to the central bank when setting
the Singapore dollar exchange rate for that quarter. More sensible would be to believe
that the MAS policymakers have at their disposal only values of those variables for
previous periods. Accordingly, equation (3) should be re-estimated by instrumental
variables, using as instruments the constant term and once-lagged values of the other
right-hand-side variables (if not already lagged). The resulting estimates are as follows:
 et =−0.0025 + 0.3256 pt
a + 0.220(yt − yt –) + 0.0385 et−1. (4)
(0.0019) (0.0895) (0.0647) (0.108) 
R
2 = 0.372     SE = 0.01284     DW = 1.997     T = 99
These results are qualitatively similar to those in (3).
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8. This approach is used by Tian (2006).
9. In (3) and in subsequent equations, SE denotes the estimated standard deviation of the disturbance term, DW is
the Durbin-Watson statistic, andT is the number of observations.
10. Evidently Parrado’s exchange rate data, which are not described, feature much more variability because of their
monthly frequency. Since the variables are changes, this seems entirely plausible.At this point we wish to test whether the real exchange rate, or its deviation from
a target value, provides independent explanatory power. As a start, we include the log
of the real exchange rate from the previous period as an additional regressor; the idea
being that if this variable (lreer) is “high,” then it will exert a downward influence on
the change in the nominal rate—its coefficient will be negative. Since the variable is
lagged, it serves as its own instrument. Instrumental variable estimates are as follows:
 et = 0.1350 + 0.3435 pt
a + 0.2475(yt − yt –) + 0.0335 et−1 − 0.0300lreert−1.
(0.0777) (0.0882) (0.0647) (0.107) (0.0169)
(5)
R
2 = 0.383     SE = 0.01279     DW = 1.994     T = 99
In this case, the real exchange rate variable provides only marginally significant incre-
mental explanatory power. Simply adding the (log) variable in this way amounts,
however, to treating its target value as constant over the entire sample period. As that
implication seems implausible, we next try entering (in the same way) the variable’s
departure from a fitted linear trend:
 et =−0.0027 + 0.3368 pt
a + 0.2473(yt − yt –) + 0.0352 et−1




2 = 0.382     SE = 0.01280     DW = 1.994     T = 99
Again the incremental explanatory power is barely significant, and experimentation with
higher polynomials in time yields results even more unfriendly to the tested hypothesis.
Again, however, the implied “equilibrium” real rate is represented in a rather unsatis-
factory manner. More ambitiously, one might attempt to construct a model of the target
rate—but that would be both problematic and beyond the scope of this study. A feasible
representation of the target rate can be constructed, however, by means of the popular
Hodrick-Prescott filter, with the departure of actual from “trend” used as the variable to
enter into the estimated policy rule. Indeed, this procedure seems rather consistent with
Williamson’s (2006) characterization of his reference value. Accordingly, we now enter 
the Hodrick-Prescott “cycle” component as the real exchange rate variable:
 et =−0.0025 + 0.3174 pt
a + 0.2666(yt − yt –) + 0.0472 et−1




2 = 0.4006     SE = 0.01261     DW = 1.971     T = 99
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error, thereby being of greater than marginal significance. So in this case, there is 
some appreciable evidence of a separate role for the real exchange rate, even though its
contribution to the adjustment of the policy variable,  et, is considerably less than that
of either the inflation or output gap variables.
11
Before drawing that conclusion, however, one should consider the possibility that the
nature of the MAS policy practice hasevolved over the 25 years since its inception. Indeed,
it would seem highly unlikely that significant changes have not occurred, especially as the
development of inflation targeting as a practical policy system began only around 1990! As
a matter of local concern, the 1985 recession in Singapore was rather severe and a major
exchange rate adjustment took place during the first two quarters of 1986. Accordingly, I
have applied the Chow parameter stability test to equation (7) for two breakpoints, 1987/
Q1 and 1989/Q1. The p-values for these tests are 0.0079 and 0.0399, clearly indicating 
the presence of a break. Then re-estimating (7) with a start date of 1990/Q1, we obtain
 et =−0.0040 + 0.5304 pt
a + 0.1735(yt − yt –) − 0.104 et−1
(0.0023) (0.1396) (0.0782) (0.146) 
− 0.0121lreerhpct−1.( 7 ′)
(0.0957)
R
2 = 0.2937     SE = 0.01086     DW = 2.027     T = 64
In this case, the role of the real exchange rate variable is not even slightly significant,
whereas the inflation variable continues to be highly important. Chow stability tests
for this sample period do not indicate breaks at any of the following dates: 1995/Q1,
1997/Q1, 1999/Q1, and 2001/Q1.
In sum, the results of the foregoing investigation provide substantial support for
the hypothesis that Singapore’s monetary policy has not, since 1990, given the real
exchange rate a role as an independent objective, in addition to the objectives of 
stabilizing inflation and output around their desired levels. The MAS policy, that is,
has since 1990 been more of an inflation-targeting regime than one of the BBC type
promoted by Williamson (1999, 2001, 2006).
12
IV. Analysis with Open-Economy Model
Let us now illustrate how any of the foregoing monetary policy rules—or others—
could be utilized in combination with a formal quantitative model, of a small economy
open to foreign trade, for the purpose of monetary policy analysis. One particular
example of such a model is the one utilized by McCallum and Nelson (1999) and
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11. The incremental contributions of the different regressors are monotonically related to the relevant t-ratios—
see, for example, Goldberger (1964).
12. In other words, the results constitute positive analysis indicating that Singapore has conducted policy in a manner
consistent with that suggested from a normative point of view by Taylor (2001, pp. 264–266).McCallum (2005). This model differs from a more standard optimizing specification
(e.g., Clarida, Gali, and Gertler [2002]) by treating imports as raw materials for the
production process rather than as finished consumer goods, but in both cases the basic
role of the (real) exchange rate is to induce substitution away from usage of foreign-
produced goods when they are relatively expensive. It is a small open-economy model
that can be summarized by means of the following equations: 
ct = Etct+1 +b0 −b1rt +vt, (8)
yt =  1ct + 2g t + 3xt, (9)
imt = yt − qt + const, (10)






*qt + const, (12)
yt – = (1 − 2)
−1[ 1at −  2qt] + const, (13)
 pt = (1 + )
−1[ Et pt+1 +  pt−1] + (yt − yt –) +ut, (14) 
Rt −R
*
t =Et st+1 + t, (15)
rt =Rt −Et pt+1. (16)
A very brief description of each will be provided. Equation (8) is a consumption (ct)
Euler equation, reflecting intertemporal optimization, while (9) is a log-linearized
approximation to an identity that splits output yt—not value added!—into three
components: consumption, government consumption gt, and exports xt.
13 Next, in
(10) import demand imt is given by cost minimization for a production function of
the CES type with   as the elasticity of substitution between imports and labor. 
An analogous relation (12) governs demand from abroad for home-country exports.
Equation (11) defines the log of the real exchange rate qt in relation to the log of the
nominal exchange rate st (st =− et) and the logs of home and foreign price levels, pt
and p
*
t. Equation (13) specifies the natural rate (i.e., flexible-price) value of the log of
real output, yt –, with this value depending upon a stochastic term at that reflects the
results of technology shocks (assumed to follow an exogenous AR(1) process with
autocorrelation parameter 0.95) and the real price of imported inputs to production.
A variant of the Calvo model of nominal price stickiness appears as (14), while (15)
represents uncovered interest rate parity, with a stochastic disturbance.
14 Finally, (16)
is the Fisher identity that defines the one-period real rate of interest rt in relation to
the nominal rateRt and expected inflation.
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13. Domestic investment would also be included in a model that distinguishes between consumption and investment
spending. The variables ct, gt, xt, and imt (as well as yt, pt, st, and qt) are in logarithms.
14. This disturbance incorporates our assumption that foreign and domestic securities are not perfect substitutes.Together with the Taylor-type policy rule (1), this model provides 10 structural
equations to generate values of the system’s 10 endogenous variables, namely, c, y, g,
x, im, p, s, q, R, and r. Thus, we can very simply establish the main point of this 
section, which is that adoption of the  st policy rule (1′) would not alter the lists of
endogenous and exogenous variables. Consequently, it follows that use of st as the
policy-rule instrument, rather than the more standard Rt, is perfectly sensible and
coherent. Which of the two instrument/indicator variables would be more desirable
will be determined by quantitative aspects of the economy under consideration. 
To make such a determination for the model given above, quantitative values have
to be assigned to each of the model’s parameters, including those that describe the
stochastic behavior of the exogenous variables and shocks that impinge upon the 
system. In McCallum (2005), I have calibrated the model (8)–(16) to represent a
“typical” industrial economy, setting the average ratio of imports (and exports) to
production (not value added) at 0.15.
15 For Singapore, the comparable figure is
approximately 0.6.
16 It will be of interest to compare the performance of policy rules
(1) and (1′), with  1 =  2 = 0.5 and smoothing of the policy variable ( 3 = 0.8)
added in each case, under these (and other) specifications of the economy’s degree of
openness, with the other aspects of the calibration kept the same.
The relevant comparison is provided in Table 1. ThereX/Y denotes the ratio of the
economy’s exports (and imports) to production, which is varied over a wide range in
the different columns. For a given calibration of the model, described in McCallum
(2005), the two rows of cells report the variability of inflation, the output gap, the
interest rate, and the exchange rate’s rate of appreciation. With all variables measured
as percentage deviations from steady-state values, quarterly but in annualized units, the
figures for inflation and the output gap represent root-mean-square deviations from
target. Accordingly, small values are more desirable than large values. 
Going across the top row, we see that with an interest rate instrument rule, poorer
performance is realized with highly open economies. Moving fromX/Y of 0.15 to 0.60,
to be specific, results in approximately no change in inflation variability but a major
increase in output gap variability. Effects on the variability of interest and appreciation
rates are minor. In the second cell row, by comparison, the exchange rate rule is 
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Table 1  Effects of Openness on Policy Rule Performance
X/Y = 0.01 X/Y = 0.15 X/Y = 0.30 X/Y = 0.60 
2.72 2.34 2.22 2.30
Rt rule (1) 2.11 1.95 2.37 4.81
2.96 2.45 2.30 2.42
19.36 18.46 17.75 16.01
4.27 3.61 3.25 2.62
 st rule (1′) 2.76 2.41 2.21 2.20
9.37 9.28 9.29 9.26
1.83 1.65 1.56 1.44
Note: Cell entries are standard deviations of  pt, yt –, Rt, and  st.
15. The model used also includes a feature representing habit formation in consumption behavior.
16. Singapore’s exports (X ) and imports (M ) are each about 1.5 times as large as GDP, implying a value of 0.6 for
M/Y. To see this, note that GDP = Y −M, so Y/M = 1 +GDP/M.increasingly effective in stabilizing inflation and output as the degree of openness is
increased. Thus, for the model at hand, it is clearly the case that an increased degree 
of openness makes use of the exchange rate rule relatively more attractive. 
Does the very high level of openness reflected byX/Y = 0.6 also make rule (1′) more
attractive in absolute terms? From the last column of Table 1, we see that in that case
variability of inflation is (slightly) increased but variability of the output gap is (greatly)
reduced by use of the exchange rate rule (relative to the case with use of the interest rate
rule). The answer will then depend upon the weight assigned by the relevant objective
function to output gap variability relative to inflation variability.
17 If the value were 
0.1 for the latter relative to inflation variability (in terms of variances), then the
exchange rate rule (1′) would be preferable. Weights somewhat lower than 0.1 are 
not uncommon in the literature, however, so the absolute superiority of (1′) is not a
foregone conclusion. Also, it is possible that the variability of Rt and  st or st would 
be taken into account by the relevant central bank. Accordingly, no conclusion of 
the absolute type can be made on the basis of our simple study.
18 For this type of 
comparison, a more precise numerical calibration of the model and a more careful 
consideration of the appropriate objective function would have to be developed. These
are tasks that are beyond the scope of this paper. 
V. Conclusions
The past three sections have developed a characterization of Singapore’s monetary 
policy—as featuring periodic adjustments of the exchange rate, used as an instrument/
indicator variable, designed to achieve objectives involving inflation and output—
and have illustrated analytically this type of policy’s relative effectiveness for economies
with very high ratios of trade to domestic production. In light of Singapore’s
macroeconomic success over the past 15 years, as discussed by various writers
including Devereux (2003), Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen (2006), McCauley
(2001), Parrado (2004), and Rajan and Siregar (2002), it seems apparent that this
type of policy regime could be an attractive contender for adoption by other highly
open economies.
A more general conclusion can be drawn, however, one that is applicable also to
economies which are not of the small and extremely open type and do not conduct
policy via an exchange rate instrument. It concerns the relationship between 
“monetary policy” and “exchange rate policy.” The main point, which should be
apparent from the policy exercises of Section IV, is that basically these are not two
different aspects of macroeconomic policy but, instead, two ways of thinking about
one macroeconomic policy tool. That is, a nation’s monetary authority can use as its
instrument/indicator variable only one chosen nominal variable—a nominal interest
rate, a nominal exchange rate, or some accurately controllable monetary aggregate
23
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17. If X/Y were assumed to be 0.75, however, the exchange rate rule would result in inflation and output standard
deviations of 2.08 and 2.15, both smaller than the values 2.56 and 7.11 provided by the interest rate rule. 
18. It is also the case that the two rules utilize “realistic” parameters, not ones optimized in terms of the model and
some specific objective function.(e.g., the monetary base). Its policy is then described by a rule for adjusting, upward
or downward, this nominal variable in response to important measures of the current
macroeconomic situation. It will make such adjustments in an attempt to keep 
chosen target variables, possibly including real variables such as employment or the
output gap but necessarily including some nominal variable, close to desired target
values. But in a market economy substantially free from distorting controls, there can
be only one such rule. In essence, then, monetary and exchange rate rules are merely
two aspects of one policy—most usefully thought of as monetary policy. Analytically,
this can be illustrated as follows. If one included both equations (1) and (1′) with the
model in (2)–(10), the system would be overdetermined. Thus there could be, except
by chance, no solution for the 10 endogenous variables.
19
In light of these observations, the widespread practice of official assignment of
(nominal) exchange rate responsibility to a nation’s fiscal authority—in other words,
its Finance Ministry or Treasury—should be recognized as unfortunate and undesir-
able. Such an assignment, pertaining to a monetary variable, is inconsistent in spirit
with the raison-d’être of central bank independence and can potentially interfere
drastically with the conduct of monetary policy. Legal arrangements of this type are
in fact present in numerous economies including the United States, the European
Union, and Japan.
20 For some of these, such as the European Union, the potential
undesirability under discussion has not been highly disruptive in practice in recent
years, because the fiscal authorities have not attempted to bring about an exchange
rate path for their economy that is inconsistent with the price level path implied by
the central bank’s monetary policy.
21 Some economists, however, would argue that
exchange rate legalisms in Japan contributed significantly to its poor macroeconomic
performance over the decade 1993–2003.
22,23 More drastically, the current situation in
China illustrates quite clearly that major difficulties for monetary policy can be
brought about by exchange rate paths which are inconsistent with appropriate and
desired monetary policy. In any event, the assignment of exchange rate responsibility
to a nation’s fiscal authority is an anachronism, left over from the pre-1973 era when
exchange rates, not central bank policy rules, provided nations’ nominal anchors.
24
The practice is bound to cause confusion, if not actual mismanagement. 
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19. This does not imply that a single monetary policy rule cannot respond (with specified weights) to two or more
nominal variables or that more than one nominal variable cannot appear in the central bank’s objective function. 
20. This is well known in the case of Japan and the European Central Bank; for the United States, see the discussion
of Broaddus and Goodfriend (1996).
21. Our argument does not imply that fiscal authorities should not have responsibility for real fiscal magnitudes, such
as the real fiscal deficit or even possibly the real trade balance, which may be structurally related to real exchange
rates. Management of nominal exchange rates will have only temporary effects on these real magnitudes, of course.
22. Economists including Svensson (2001) and McCallum (2000) have argued that effective monetary stimulus to
combat the Japanese deflation of 1995–2003 could have been provided by central bank purchases of foreign
exchange, and some members of the Bank of Japan staff believed that such a strategy deserved consideration,
given the apparent (and theoretical) inability of the Bank of Japan to affect spending by purchase of short-term
domestic securities. It was decided, however, that foreign exchange operations could only be made at the direction
of the Ministry of Finance. For additional discussion, see McCallum (2003, pp. 22–27). 
23. Some would also argue that Japanese exchange rate management by the Ministry of Finance during the late
1980s, based to some extent on urgings of the U.S. government, contributed strongly to the asset price bubble
that in turn led to the tightening of Japanese monetary policy in 1989 which began the deflation. 
24. The anachronistic nature of this assignment comes through strongly in Broaddus and Goodfriend (1996).25
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DATA APPENDIX 
Observations NEER REER CPI GDPRSG
1980/Q1 71.81000 98.59700 66.00700 8,966.000
Q2 71.06000 96.32330 66.94400 9,317.000
Q3 71.12300 95.44300 68.12400 9,648.000
Q4 72.02300 95.54700 68.69800 10,028.000
1981/Q1 73.22000 96.35300 69.69600 9,790.000
Q2 75.14000 100.43700 72.11500 10,268.000
Q3 77.90000 105.03300 74.62500 10,628.000
Q4 78.98000 106.19300 75.41100 10,967.000
1982/Q1 80.14300 107.63700 76.16700 10,682.000
Q2 80.98000 106.57000 75.29000 11,015.000
Q3 82.27700 106.83300 75.65300 11,311.000
Q4 82.07300 106.59700 76.16700 11,614.000
1983/Q1 83.70000 108.32700 76.53000 11,471.000
Q2 84.51700 108.45300 76.37800 11,883.000
Q3 84.94300 108.02000 76.65000 12,292.000
Q4 84.71300 107.72000 77.34600 12,777.000
1984/Q1 85.28000 109.09300 78.82800 12,712.000
Q2 86.11000 109.45700 78.55500 13,009.000
Q3 87.29300 110.40300 78.97900 13,306.000
Q4 88.72000 110.80700 78.52500 13,431.000
1985/Q1 89.14300 110.90700 79.00900 13,084.800
Q2 88.09300 109.00000 79.00900 12,890.500
Q3 85.72700 105.54000 79.40200 12,904.200
Q4 84.76300 103.40300 78.97900 12,822.500
1986/Q1 80.55700 97.13700 78.58600 12,625.900
Q2 75.52300 90.42300 77.76900 13,019.600
Q3 74.88300 88.95700 77.73900 13,388.200
Q4 75.14000 89.04000 77.92000 13,775.300
1987/Q1 74.07000 87.25000 77.95100 13,571.100
Q2 72.29300 84.80000 78.10200 14,165.100
Q3 73.71300 86.26700 78.70700 14,821.500
Q4 72.73700 84.80000 78.88800 15,390.500
1988/Q1 72.71000 84.55700 79.19000 15,055.600
Q2 72.55000 83.85300 79.28100 15,909.200
Q3 74.27000 85.21700 79.91600 16,583.600
Q4 74.50000 84.71670 80.03700 16,954.500
1989/Q1 77.05700 86.90300 80.18800 16,513.200
Q2 78.65700 88.52000 81.18600 17,785.200
Q3 78.91700 88.75000 81.91200 18,149.600
Q4 79.21700 89.11000 82.60700 18,451.400
1990/Q1 80.92300 93.15000 83.30300 18,642.200
Q2 82.40300 94.32700 83.81700 19,058.100
Q3 82.97300 94.45000 84.39100 19,657.900
Q4 83.55300 95.18700 85.66100 19,940.700
1991/Q1 83.71700 95.60700 86.35700 19,840.700
Q2 85.41700 97.43000 87.05200 20,285.900
Q3 87.50000 99.28000 87.41500 21,108.400
Q4 88.04700 99.35700 87.89900 21,289.500
1992/Q1 89.00300 100.08300 88.29200 20,921.100
Q2 89.15300 99.96700 89.01700 21,452.200
Q3 88.26000 98.87000 89.44100 22,532.900
Q4 89.68700 100.27300 89.86400 23,140.900
1993/Q1 90.22000 100.55700 90.46900 22,880.900
Q2 89.61700 99.45000 90.92200 24,269.600
Q3 90.38300 100.10300 91.37600 25,286.600
Q4 92.41000 102.38000 92.01100 26,401.100
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Observations NEER REER CPI GDPRSG
1994/Q1 93.02300 102.92700 92.79700 26,169.600
Q2 93.90000 104.27000 93.76500 26,726.000
Q3 94.25000 104.45300 94.49000 28,433.300
Q4 95.90000 106.12300 95.03400 28,780.500
1995/Q1 96.68300 106.28700 95.12500 27,892.300
Q2 95.63700 105.01000 95.73000 28,947.300
Q3 97.15000 106.03300 95.79000 30,867.400
Q4 98.82700 107.43000 95.91100 31,255.700
1996/Q1 100.37700 108.65700 96.36500 31,356.500
Q2 101.23300 109.11700 96.84900 31,674.800
Q3 101.12000 108.50300 97.15100 32,306.300
Q4 102.36700 109.46000 97.48400 33,315.000
1997/Q1 103.88300 111.03300 98.02800 32,909.400
Q2 103.44000 110.40000 98.51200 34,567.800
Q3 103.09700 110.01700 99.35800 35,913.500
Q4 102.62700 109.20300 99.72100 36,208.000
1998/Q1 105.98300 110.62000 99.15940 34,262.100
Q2 107.44000 110.41300 98.63200 34,293.200
Q3 103.92300 105.59300 98.50000 34,670.500
Q4 102.63300 103.41000 98.26900 35,173.400
1999/Q1 99.24300 99.92670 98.43400 34,978.800
Q2 99.70000 100.50000 98.59900 36,541.200
Q3 100.06000 100.59700 98.79700 37,585.900
Q4 99.66000 99.77330 98.79700 38,181.600
2000/Q1 99.09700 99.37330 99.52200 38,347.500
Q2 99.17700 99.13670 99.42300 39,554.000
Q3 100.03000 99.96000 100.28000 41,355.200
Q4 101.69700 101.52300 100.77500 41,886.100
2001/Q1 102.34000 101.90300 101.20300 39,906.100
Q2 101.29000 100.38700 101.10400 39,058.500
Q3 102.58700 101.18700 101.10400 39,018.500
Q4 100.27300 98.41670 100.57700 39,335.400
2002/Q1 101.31700 98.72000 100.34600 39,292.100
Q2 100.58700 98.00000 100.67600 40,551.100
Q3 100.58000 97.47670 100.67600 40,485.400
Q4 100.71700 97.31000 100.70900 40,524.800
2003/Q1 100.07300 96.24330 101.03800 39,802.900
Q2 98.44000 94.48000 100.87400 39,010.200
Q3 97.94300 93.87700 101.17000 41,457.000
Q4 96.94700 92.69670 101.36800 42,822.000
2004/Q1 97.04700 92.99330 102.30500 42,947.300
Q2 98.04700 93.75330 102.75100 43,808.400
Q3 97.79000 93.05670 103.09400 44,441.900
Q4 98.58700 93.24330 103.02500 45,605.400
2005/Q1 98.33000 92.18000 102.54500 44,106.900
Q2 98.25300 91.73670 102.78500 46,086.400
Q3 98.72300 91.85700 103.57400 47,788.000
Q4 99.48300 92.47300 104.19000 49,921.000
Note: NEER, REER, and CPI are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics electronic
database. These are index values of Singapore’s nominal effective exchange rate, real effective
exchange rate, and the consumer price index, respectively. The other series, GDPRSG, is real
GDP. The values for 1982/Q3–2004/Q3 were provided by Gerlach and Gerlach-Kristen (2006)
(from the Bank for International Settlements database), with 2004/Q4–2005/Q4 values spliced
on from International Financial Statistics.
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